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ABSTRACT 
The United States is facing a retirement crisis, in significant part 
because defined benefit pension plans have been replaced by defined 
contribution retirement plans that, whatever their theoretical merit, have 
left significant numbers of workers unprepared for retirement. A troubling 
example of the continuing movement away from defined benefit plans is a 
new phenomenon euphemistically called “pension de-risking.” 
Recent years have been marked by high-profile companies engaging in 
various actions designed to reduce the company’s exposure to pension 
funding risk (hence the term “pension de-risking”). Some de-risking 
strategies convert a federally-guaranteed pension into a riskier private 
annuity. Other approaches convert the pension into cash for the 
beneficiary, which may be insufficient to provide lasting retirement 
income. These strategies have raised many concerns that participants are 
being disadvantaged and that pension de-risking is undermining the 
statutory purpose of ERISA. 
Regulators are only beginning to consider ways to appropriately police 
pension de-risking behavior. We propose that the government should take 
an aggressive stance in regulating such conduct. Participants as a class 
should not be made worse off by a pension de-risking transaction, and the 
relevant de-risking rules should so reflect. More specifically, regulators 
should: (1) encourage desirable forms of de-risking by establishing 
regulatory safe harbors; (2) require a battery of procedural safeguards 
for annuitization transactions; (3) require improved disclosures for cash 
buyouts; and (4) limit cash buyouts when beneficiaries are not likely to 
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meaningfully understand the potentially adverse consequences of trading 
a pension for cash. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Retirement planning is not only difficult, but also dangerous. It is 
dangerous for individuals because poor planning can mean post-
employment penury. It is dangerous for companies because it is much 
easier to make promises than to keep them. It is dangerous for elected 
officials because they will take the blame if elderly poverty is widespread. 
We therefore are living in dangerous times: too many Americans are 
saving too little for retirement.
1
  
 
 
 1.  See Hazel Bradford, Study: Retirement Crisis Real and Getting Worse, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.pionline.com/article/20150126/ONLINE/150129904/study-
retirement-crisis-real-and-getting-worse (“The most convincing estimates project that more than 50% 
of households will fall short, and even the most optimistic studies predict that nearly one-quarter of 
retirees will, [Center for American Progress] researchers found.”). Low rates of personal savings are 
alarming and have a detrimental impact on retirement, serving only to “exacerbate[] the impact of 
looming shortfalls in Social Security and in employer-sponsored pension programs.” Stephen F. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/7
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One reason for that is recent history. In the last thirty years, employers 
have transitioned away from “defined benefit” (“DB”) plans (where a 
worker earns a monthly pension for a lifetime of work) to “defined 
contribution” (“DC”) plans (where a worker builds up a retirement savings 
account, invests the principal, and then draws down the account in 
retirement).
2
 Whatever the theoretical appeal of DC plans, the real world 
result has been disappointing. Workers have neither saved enough nor 
invested those savings wisely.
3
  
Many large companies, interestingly, still have “legacy” DB plans: 
retirement plans applicable to older employees that were in place before 
the company transitioned into a DC plan for newer employees.
4
 The 
burden of funding and maintaining those plans is substantial.
5
 A growing 
number of firms are seeking to creatively manage those obligations in 
ways designed to reduce the company’s exposure to funding risk.6 The 
 
 
Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, 
Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 961 (2007); see also Teresa Ghilarducci, 
Retirement Security Worse on ERISA’s 40th Anniversary, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 453, 453 (2014) 
(discussing how about 48% of workers between the ages of fifty and sixty-four will be poor when they 
reach retirement).  
 2. Samuel Estreicher & Laurence Gold, The Shift from Defined Benefit Plans to Defined 
Contribution Plans, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 331, 331 (2007) (discussing the shift from defined 
benefit to defined contribution pension plans).  
 3. See Bradford, supra note 1 (quoting David Madland, managing director of the Center for 
American Progress’s economic policy team) (“The biggest problems are that far too many people don't 
have access to a private-sector retirement plan, and secondly, the plans they do have access to aren't 
very good . . . .”); see also Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics and the 
Retirement Savings Crisis, 339 SCIENCE MAG. 1152 (2013), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth. 
edu/richard.thaler/research/pdf/Behavioral%20Economics%20and%20the%20Retirement%20Savings
%20Crisis.pdf (discussing increased percentage of workers at risk of not having adequate funds in 
retirement). Furthermore, the Department of Labor has expressed concern over individuals’ ability to 
understand investment principles in order to make well-informed decisions in the context of their 
defined contribution plans. See Matthew Venhorst, Helping Individual Investors Do What They Know 
Is Right: The Save More for Retirement Act of 2005, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 113, 119 (2006). 
 4. Daniel Keating, Why the Bankruptcy Reform Act Left Labor Legacy Costs Alone, 71 MO. L. 
REV. 985, 986, 988–90 (2006) (explaining how underfunded defined benefit plans are a category of 
labor “legacy” costs for employers, and defining “legacy” as a type of “deferred maintenance” that 
employer owes employee).  
 5. See, e.g., Janice Kay McClendon, The Death Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans: 
Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) Bottom, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 809, 822–25 (2007) (discussing funding 
considerations as one of the factors contributing to the shift from defined benefit to defined 
contribution pension plans); cf. Press Release, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., PBGC Annual Report 
Shows Improvement in Single-Employer Program and Deterioration in Multiemployer Program (Nov. 
17, 2014), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr14-15.html (finding the “program’s 
potential exposure to future pension losses from financially weak companies” to be about $167 
billion); see also infra Part I (discussing funding risk in more detail). 
 6. See Letter from Senators Harkin and Wyden to Jacob Lew, U.S. Secretary of Treasury, 
Thomas E. Perez, U.S. Secretary of Labor, Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, and Alice Maroni, Acting Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (Oct. 22, 2014), 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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industry term for those risk-reducing strategies is “pension de-risking.”7  
Some “de-risking” strategies are internal, meaning that the pension 
obligation is retained by the company but managed differently.
8
 Other 
solutions are external, meaning that the pension obligation is offloaded 
from the company to another party.
9
 Observers are particularly worried 
about external de-risking, and rightly so. For example, the “annuitization” 
approach converts a federally-protected pension into a riskier private 
annuity;
10
 and the “lump sum” approach converts the pension into cash for 
the beneficiary, which may be insufficient to provide lasting retirement 
income.
11
 Neither approach prioritizes beneficiary welfare consistent with 
the dictates of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”).12 
Like many pension matters, de-risking sounds arcane but involves 
obscene amounts of money. In the last few years, for example, Verizon, 
General Motors, Ford, Motorola, and Bristol-Myers Squibb have all 
undertaken pension de-risking transactions. Together, these transactions 
were worth over $100 billion and affected hundreds of thousands of 
workers, retirees, and their beneficiaries.
13
 More de-risking is sure to 
come, and the number of persons affected will continue to rise. 
 
 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/102214%20Derisking%20Letter.pdf (“Employers undertake 
de-risking transactions to mitigate future pension funding risks”). Funding risks will be discussed in 
more detail in Part I. 
 7. See id.  
 8. See infra Part I.B.  
 9. See Mary B. Andersen, Understanding the Basics About Derisking Becomes First Step to 
Decisionmaking, PENSION PLAN FIX-IT HANDBOOK NEWSLETTER (Thompson Info. Serv., Bethesda, 
Md.), Jan. 2014, at 2. 
 10. See Private Sector Pension De-Risking and Participant Protections: Hearing Before the 
ERISA Advisory Council 4–5 (June 5, 2013) (statement of Robert S. Newman, Covington & Burling 
LLP), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/covingtonburling060513.pdf [hereinafter Newman 
Testimony] (discussing purchase of annuity certificates as external de-risking strategy companies use, 
resulting in a loss of ERISA protection of plan benefits). 
 11. See Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant Protections: Hearing Before the 
ERISA Advisory Council 8–9 (Aug. 29, 2013) (statement of David Certner, Legislative Council and 
Legislative Policy Director, AARP), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/AARP082913.pdf 
[hereinafter Certner Testimony] (observing that lump-sum offers are less secure and have a reduced 
value compared to an individual’s pension annuity). Individuals who retain their defined benefit 
annuity “are far less likely to outlive their assets or fall into poverty.” Id. at 8. 
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2014). 
 13. See, e.g., Lee v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 2012 WL 6089041 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2012) 
(holding Verizon pension de-risking transaction lawful under ERISA); Fred Meier, Ford Offers 
Retirees Lump Sum to Buy Out Pensions, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2012, 3:45 PM), 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/driveon/post/2012/04/ford-will-offer-to-buy-out-its-retirees-
pensions/1 (Ford); GM Announces U.S. Salaried Pension Plan Actions: Offers Lump-Sums to Many 
Retirees; Prudential to Assume Monthly Benefits, GM (June 1, 2012) http://media.gm.com/media/us/ 
en/gm/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2012/Jun/0601_pension.html (GM); Robert Newman, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/7
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This Article is the first treatment of pension de-risking in the legal 
literature. In Part I, we offer a succinct explanation of what pension de-
risking is and why it will accelerate. In so doing, we clear away the 
complex regulatory brushwood that so often impairs mainstream 
consideration of pension issues and provide an accessible foundation for 
future de-risking discussions.  
In Part II, we offer a policy frame that clarifies the problem pension de-
risking poses. Pension regulation should promote retirement security. By 
converting federally-protected pensions into private annuities or cash, 
pension de-risking does the opposite. Regulators should keep that in mind. 
In Part III, we offer a roadmap for reform. In many pension contexts, 
robust regulation may deter employers from offering voluntary retirement 
plans in the first place, so regulators need to balance protecting 
beneficiaries against employer flight.
14
 No similar pressure exists here. No 
employer will be deterred from offering a DB plan on account of strict de-
risking rules because virtually no employers are offering new DB plans in 
the first place.
15
 Accordingly, regulators can realistically prioritize 
protecting beneficiaries.  
After describing the legal framework for de-risking, we make four 
suggestions. The government should: (1) encourage internal de-risking by 
establishing regulatory safe harbors; (2) require a battery of procedural 
safeguards for annuitization transactions; (3) require improved disclosures 
for cash buyouts; and (4) limit cash buyouts when beneficiaries are not 
likely to meaningfully understand the potentially adverse consequences of 
trading a pension for cash.  
I. CONCEPTUALIZING PENSION DE-RISKING 
On its own, the term “pension de-risking” is too vague to do much 
useful work. Below, we develop a vocabulary that will make discussion of 
 
 
Motorola Solutions Announces Third-Largest Pension De-Risking Transaction, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 
26, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/motorola-solutions-announces-third-largest-pension-
de-risking-transaction (Motorola); Robert Steyer, Bristol-Myers Squibb Announces $1.4 Billion 
Pension Buyout, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Sept. 30, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.pionline.com/ 
article/20140930/ONLINE/140939971/bristol-myers-squibb-announces-14-billion-pension-buyout 
(Bristol-Myers Squibb).  
 14. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 42 (1987) (stating that ERISA's “civil 
enforcement scheme . . . represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims 
settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit 
plans”); see also id. at 54.  
 15. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 488 
(2004) (“By the 1980s, the defined benefit system was stagnating. Virtually no new defined benefit 
plans were being created.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the phenomenon, and potential reforms, intelligible. We also explain why 
pension de-risking demands immediate attention: because it is likely to 
accelerate. 
A. ERISA & Pension Basics 
ERISA, with narrow exceptions, governs retirement promises made 
incident to employment.
16
 ERISA requires such pension promises to be 
effectuated under what the statute calls a “plan” that is created by the 
sponsoring employer.
17
 Those plans, for our purposes, come in two 
varieties: the “defined benefit” plan and the “defined contribution” plan.  
A defined benefit plan is where the retirement promise is defined in 
terms of what the employee can expect to receive upon retirement (e.g., a 
fixed, periodic payment based on the employee’s years of service and 
average salary).
18
 A DB entitlement is functionally an annuity earned 
through service and paid for by foregone wages. A DB benefit is what 
most people think of when they hear the word “pension.” ERISA heavily 
regulates DB arrangements.
19
 
A defined contribution plan, in contrast, is where the retirement 
entitlement is defined in terms of what the employee (and sometimes the 
employer) “contributes” to a retirement savings account, plus any 
investment appreciation on those contributions.
20
 A DC arrangement is 
functionally a constrained savings account. A classic example of a DC 
arrangement is a 401(k) plan. ERISA regulates DC arrangements, but far 
less strictly than it does DB plans.
21
 
Pension de-risking involves DB plans, and for all forms of de-risking, 
the underlying motivation is the same. An employer made a DB promise 
long ago. Afterward, it determines that its current strategy for keeping the 
pension promise is too costly or too afflicted with uncertainty.
22
 So the 
company considers a number of alternate strategies to handle its pension 
 
 
 16. See Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 
445–46 (2010). 
 17. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)–(3) (2014).  
 18. Maher & Stris, supra note 16, at 446. 
 19. See id. at 451–56 (discussing ERISA regulation of defined benefit plans).  
 20. Id. at 448. 
 21. See id. at 456 (maintaining that ERISA does regulate defined contribution plans and subjects 
plans to some of the rules that govern defined benefit plans; however, “these plans were a relatively 
minor part of the pension landscape” when ERISA was enacted).  
 22. See Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt, Promises to Keep: Ensuring the Payment of Americans’ 
Pension Benefits in the Wake of the Great Recession, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 393, 393, 407 (2013) 
(observing that recessionary times make it difficult for defined benefit plan sponsors to pay promised 
pension benefits).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/7
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obligation. Thus, at the broadest level, pension de-risking refers to any 
strategy a company undertakes to mitigate the risk associated with 
carrying a DB pension obligation.
23
  
As we discuss below, some de-risking strategies are “internal,” 
meaning that the pension obligation is retained within the company, but 
the plan is managed differently.
24
 Other solutions are “external,” meaning 
that the pension obligation is offloaded to another party.
25
 The focus of 
this Article is largely on external de-risking; external strategies 
particularly worry observers because they transfer risk to beneficiaries and 
are only partially subject to ERISA.
26
 Internal strategies, in contrast, are 
less worrisome because they do not transfer any risk to beneficiaries and 
are entirely governed by ERISA.
27
 To the extent, however, that regulatory 
uncertainty regarding the permissibility of internal de-risking strategies 
will motivate some employers to pursue external de-risking strategies 
instead, we pause to discuss internal de-risking. 
B. Internal De-risking 
An internal de-risking strategy is any strategy in which the plan retains 
the underlying DB obligation but adjusts its mix of assets to reduce 
funding volatility.
28
 DB plans in effect promise annuities, which are due at 
specific times, in specific amounts, and are subject to ERISA-imposed 
funding requirements along the way.
29
 The upshot is that an investment 
strategy for the plan assets underlying the collective pension promise—
even if over the long run it meets or exceeds its obligations—can be a bad 
“match” for the pension obligations that are or will soon come due.  
 
 
 23.  See Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant Protections: Hearing Before the 
ERISA Advisory Council 1 (Aug. 29, 2013) (statement of Brendan S. Maher, Law Professor, 
University of Connecticut School of Law), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/UCLaw 
082913.pdf [hereinafter Maher Testimony]. 
 24. See infra Part I.B. 
 25. See infra Part I.C. 
 26. See Newman Testimony, supra note 10, at 2 (“After an individual’s pension benefits are 
settled, the individual ceases to be a participant in the plan, ERISA ceases to govern the benefit, and 
the PBGC no longer insures the benefit.”). 
 27. See id. (discussing in-plan de-risking strategies and how they are subject to ERISA’s 
fiduciary duties of prudence, loyalty, and prudent diversification of plan assets). 
 28. See Brendan McFarland & Erika Stoner, 2012 Asset Allocations in Fortune 1000 Pension 
Plans, TOWERS WATSON (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/Newsle 
tters/Americas/insider/2013/2012-asset-allocations-in-fortune-1000-pension-plans (“Such a [glide path 
strategy] reduces funding volatility by shifting assets from equities to debt as funding levels improve, 
thereby safeguarding gains by reducing risk . . . .”). 
 29. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text; see also Anne Tucker, Retirement 
Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 168 (2013). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
740 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:733 
 
 
 
 
Some internal de-risking strategies attempt to more closely match plan 
investments to plan benefit payouts.
30
 A very simple internal de-risking 
strategy of this type would be for a plan to simply purchase and hold 
annuities that paid out to the plan as the plan’s liabilities to pensioners 
came due. Other strategies attempt to reduce the volatility of the plan’s 
investments, such as purchasing high-grade bonds or hedging against 
undesirable market fluctuations.
31
  
C. External De-risking 
An external de-risk occurs when an entity other than the plan becomes 
the bearer of the risk associated with providing retirement income to the 
beneficiary. In other words, the risk associated with the pension promise is 
“externalized” relative to the plan. As many observers have correctly 
noted, the term “de-risking” in this context is fairly misleading; 
meaningful risk still exists, it is just no longer borne by the plan.
32
 A more 
precise articulation of how the risk is externalized, however, is necessary.  
 
 
 30. This is sometimes referred to as “liability-driven investing,” or “LDI.” See, e.g., EMP’T RET. 
INCOME SEC. ACT ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PRIVATE SECTOR PENSION DE-RISKING 
AND PARTICIPANT PROTECTIONS 13 (2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ 
2013ACreport2.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL DE-RISKING REPORT] (“In-plan strategies include restricting 
participation or accruals, hedging and immunization (both considered liability-driven investing (LDI)), 
and buy-ins.”); see also Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis: Multiemployer 
Benefit Plans on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL ’Y 77, 94–95 (2011) (referring to same 
internal de-risking strategy as “liability-aware” investing). 
 31.  See Newman Testimony, supra note 10, at 1 (“Hedging involves investing to offset some of 
the factors that drive funding volatility, such as changes in interest rates.”); Mercer Proposes 5 Ways 
for Pension Sponsors to Manage Funded Position, Risk in 2015, PENSION PLAN FIX-IT HANDBOOK 
NEWSLETTER (Thompson Info. Serv., Bethesda, Md.), Feb. 2015, at 4 (explaining that building a 
portfolio of high-grade bonds can be a way to manage plan liabilities). 
 32. See Private Sector Pension Derisking and Participant Protections: Hearing Before the 
ERISA Advisory Council 3 (Aug. 29, 2013) (statement of Norman Stein, Professor, Drexel University 
Earle Mack School of Law), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/DrexelU082913.pdf 
[hereinafter Stein Testimony] (“The term de-risking is not a statutory or technical term; rather, it is a 
generic term that refers to a variety of approaches that employers use to control the risks inherent in 
the promise to pay employees a set monthly payment for life after they retire.”); see also Edited 
Transcript of VZ-Q4 2012 Verizon Earnings Conference Call 8 (Jan. 22, 2013, 1:30 PM), available at 
http://www.verizon.com/about/file/947/download/?token=0WOyrHdm. As Verizon CFO Francis J. 
Shammo observed, Verizon’s annuity de-risking transaction reduced the company’s exposure “to 
funding and income statement volatility caused by changes in investment returns, discount rates and 
longevity risks.” Id. The company’s investment and longevity risk does not just vanish, of course. It 
simply gets transferred to the retiree. See also Motorola Launches Third-Largest U.S. Pension Buyout, 
Hopes to Shed $4.2 Billion in Obligations, PENSION PLAN FIX-IT HANDBOOK NEWSLETTER 
(Thompson Info. Serv., Bethesda, Md.), Nov. 2014, at 4. Annuitization, for example, transfers the risk 
of pension promises to insurance companies and also to plan participants, who have no PBGC 
protection in the event the insurance company is unable to pay pension benefits. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/7
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Consider the starting point of any external de-risk: the plan owes 
beneficiaries a DB pension it wishes to offload. Recall that a DB pension 
is essentially (1) an annuity (2) that is heavily regulated by ERISA. Thus, 
without spelling out any more details, we can say that any company 
considering de-risking starts out owing beneficiaries an “ERISA Annuity.” 
From that perspective, external de-risking is the process by which a 
company converts a pension entitlement in the form of an ERISA Annuity 
into something else. The question: what is that something else?  
There are two things a company may convert an ERISA Annuity into: 
(1) a Non-ERISA Annuity or (2) a Non-ERISA Lump Sum.
33
 A Non-
ERISA Annuity is exactly what it sounds like: an annuity promise 
regulated by some law other than ERISA. A Non-ERISA Lump Sum 
requires a little more explanation. As a matter of actuarial math, all 
annuities can be converted to lump sums based on certain assumptions 
about the lifetime of the beneficiary and the applicable discount rates.
34
 A 
Non-ERISA Lump Sum is what results when an ERISA Annuity is 
converted into an actuarially equivalent lump sum (and then given to the 
beneficiary to use outside the confines of an ERISA-governed plan).  
Thus, without having yet considered any specifics, we can conceive of 
“external de-risking” as referring to the set of processes by which a plan 
sponsor can permissibly convert an ERISA Annuity into either (1) a Non-
ERISA Annuity or (2) a Non-ERISA Lump Sum. Of considerable interest 
to regulators and reformers is what the legal rules governing those 
processes should be. Some of those rules are fairly clear, but others are 
not. Yet discussion of possible reforms—whether to revise existing rules 
or promulgate new ones—can only sensibly proceed after a realistic 
 
 
 33. See Newman Testimony, supra note 10, at 2 (describing lump-sum offers and annuity 
purchases from insurance companies as two “settlement strategies” designed to “discharge the plan’s 
obligations to participants”). As for annuities, plans are not allowed to make annuity purchases unless 
they are at least 80% funded. Id. at 4 (citing I.R.C. § 436(d)). More recently, “[i]n Notice 2015-49, . . . 
the IRS has now concluded that . . . lump sum windows ‘undermine the intent’ of the minimum 
required distribution regulations to prohibit changes to annuity payments once they begin.” Robert 
Newman, Pension De-Risking Gets New Rules: IRS Shuts Down Lump Sum Offers to Retirees While 
Connecticut Increases Safety of Group Annuity Contracts, COVINGTON (July 9, 2015), 
http://www.insidecompensation.com/2015/07/09/pension-de-risking-gets-new-rules-irs-shuts-down-
lump-sum-offers-to-retirees-while-connecticut-increases-safety-of-group-annuity-contracts/. 
 34. See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 115 (4th ed. 2015). A promise to pay money twenty years from now is worth less than the 
face value of the promise, both because there’s a risk the promisor will not pay, and because money 
later is worth less than money today. Id. at 115–16. A promise to make periodic payments beginning at 
retirement and ending at death (which is what a simple pension is) is also worth some net-present-
value-adjusted amount of money today (“lump sum”); that adjustment depends on interest rates and 
the expected lifetime of the recipient. Id. at 117. 
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appraisal of why employment-based retirement arrangements are regulated 
in the first place. We offer such an appraisal in Part II below. Before doing 
so, however, we explain why pension de-risking is a phenomenon likely to 
grow.  
D. Why Pension De-risking Will Accelerate 
For three reasons, the current environment favors pension de-risking 
transactions.
35
 First, employers today face less organic resistance from the 
workforce when moving away from DB approaches than they would have 
in the past. Younger American employees are more likely to receive—and 
expect to receive—a DC plan than in the past.36 Whereas older generations 
were used to a DB plan environment where the company was responsible 
for their pensions (backed by a PBGC guarantee),
37
 younger workers have 
grown up in a different world. They have long known that they, rather than 
their employers or the government, are primarily responsible for their own 
retirement security.
38
 Generally, only older workers and retirees are 
threatened when employers undertake pension de-risking strategies.
39
 The 
 
 
 35. Cf. COUNCIL DE-RISKING REPORT, supra note 30, at 4 (“Commentators have proffered many 
reasons for this trend in de-risking ranging from plan sponsors’ desires to reduce the impact of the 
volatility of their pension plan obligations on their financial statements and in their funding 
requirements; the revised mortality and interest rates in the Pension Protection Act and subsequent 
legislation providing for pension funding relief; the current interest rate environment; the desire to 
lower administrative costs, including reduction or elimination of rising PBGC premiums; the current 
and future funding status of the plan; and/or considerations unique to a specific plan sponsor or 
industry.”).  
 36.  See McClendon, supra note 5, at 820–21 (discussing the changing demographics in the 
American workplace, and the effects this has had on the shift from defined benefit to defined 
contribution plans). Today’s workers tend to favor the 401(k) plan and its defined contribution 
counterparts because they “place[] less emphasis on retirement plans that reward long-term service 
and, instead, favor[] plans that provide more immediate, tangible retirement benefits, those that offer 
benefit front-loading, accessibility, and portability.” Id. at 821 (footnote omitted).  
 37.  Id. at 814. “The 1980s and 1990s evidence a mass exodus from defined benefit plan 
sponsorship.” Id. Prior to then, the defined benefit plan was the primary means by which employers 
provided pension benefits to employees. Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan 
Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 74 (2002). The term “PBGC” refers to the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation. See infra note 69. 
 38.  Because of the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, many American 
workers now rely on defined contribution plans, such as the 401(k) plan, as their primary source of 
“employer-provided retirement income.” Stabile, supra note 37, at 74–75. 401(k) plans place many 
important plan decisions in the hands of the individual, such as whether to participate in the plan, how 
much to contribute, and how to invest those contributions, so individuals really are responsible for 
their own retirement security. Id. at 78.  
 39. See Certner Testimony, supra note 11, at 2 (stating that companies who are making the 
decision to de-risk are often “targeting retirees in pay status”). Offers of lump sums to retirees in pay 
status can be “greatly disruptive and distressing,” and many retirees faced with lump-sum offers have 
reported increased levels of stress, anxiety, and sleeplessness. Id. at 9–10. The recent IRS ruling 
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only other employees impacted by these transactions are the so-called 
“vested terminated employees” who, even though they have vested 
pension rights, no longer work for the employer.
40
 These vested terminated 
employees have even less of a voice in seeking to dissuade employers 
from undertaking these transactions because of their absence from the 
workplace and, in some cases, their unfamiliarity that they even have such 
benefits from a past job.
41
 Indeed, some studies suggest that terminated 
vested employees prefer receiving a lump-sum payment than having to 
wait until retirement age to receive what might be a relatively small 
pension annuity.
42
 So, far from fighting such pension de-risking moves, 
such workers might actually support them. 
Second, financial forces support more pension de-risking behavior.
43
 
Of particular salience is that in recent years pension obligations have 
become relatively larger compared to company size.
44
 This phenomenon is 
in turn related to two developments. On the one hand, financial accounting 
rules (including FAS 158)
45
 have required companies to place their 
 
 
should limit lump-sum (but not annuitization) approaches targeted at employees in pay status. See 
supra note 33.  
 40. See Glossary, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov/about/pg/ 
header/glossary.html#27 (last visited June 16, 2014) (defining a terminated vested employee generally 
as “a former employee who worked long enough to earn ‘Vested Benefits’ in a pension plan, but who 
left the company sponsoring the plan without receiving a retirement benefit immediately” and noting 
that “[s]uch a participant can receive benefit payments from the plan once he or she reaches the plan’s 
‘Normal Retirement Age’ or, if the plan allows, the plan’s ‘Early Retirement Age’”). 
 41. See EMP’T RET. INCOME SEC. ACT ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LOCATING 
MISSING AND LOST PARTICIPANTS 11, 22 (2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ 
2013ACreport3.pdf. 
 42. See COUNCIL DE-RISKING REPORT, supra note 30, at 16; see also Private Sector Pension De-
risking and Participant Protections: Hearing Before the ERISA Advisory Council 6 (June 5, 2013) 
(statement of Craig Rosenthal, Partner, Mercer, American Benefits Council), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ABC060513.pdf [hereinafter Rosenthal Testimony] (“[I]n the case of 
one-time lump sum offers (including offers in connection with a plan termination), the election 
percentage for participants who have not yet commenced benefits tends to be lower, typically in the 
40% to 60% range. It is important to note that in situations where there is a one-time offer of a lump 
sum, the lump sum election percentages are often correlated with the age of the participant.”).  
 43. See Rosenthal Testimony, supra note 42, at 1–2 (describing all of the changes and 
developments in the law regarding pension plan funding, which have increased the cost of providing 
and maintaining defined benefit pension plans). Some of the financial forces motivating companies to 
de-risk include the “size of the pension plan liabilities relative to the overall size of the plan sponsor,” 
administrative costs, higher PBGC premiums, and balance sheet volatility. Id. at 3.  
 44. See id. at 3.  
 45. FAS 158 refers to the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement No. 158: 
Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans—An Amendment 
of FASB Statements No. 87, 88, 106, and 132(R). See Summary of Statement No. 158, FIN. ACCT. 
STABILITY BD., http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum158.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).  
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pension liabilities in their public financial statements,
46
 making more 
readily apparent the sheer size of the pension funding obligations that 
many companies currently have.
47
 On the other hand, new funding rules 
under the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
48
 and higher PBGC premiums, 
have forced companies to put aside larger and larger amounts of money to 
keep their pension plans fully funded and in compliance with ERISA 
obligations.
49
 In addition, expected rising interest rates and improved 
funding ratios for many plans mean that it will be less expensive to 
transfer their pension liabilities to insurance companies.
50
 
Third, employers no longer need DB plans to recruit and retain the best 
workers. Because virtually all private-sector employers are only offering 
DC plans to their newly-hired workers, there is no competitive pressure to 
offer or retain DB plans.
51
 Of course, the decline of organized labor in the 
private sector also leads to a dynamic where workers as a whole have less 
of a voice in the American workplace to protest these types of de-risking 
 
 
 46. See Rosenthal Testimony, supra note 42, at 2 (“[I]mplementation of FAS 158 required most 
sponsors to reflect the mark-to-market values of pension plan assets and liabilities directly on their 
balance sheets starting at year-end 2006.”). 
 47. See Joe Lustig, Plan Sponsor De-risking Likely to Continue Even With Higher Funding, 
Practitioners Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.bna.com/plan-sponsor-derisking-
b17179881745/ (quoting Professor Norman Stein for the proposition that “plan sponsors should lobby 
Congress to change the funding rules so that funding is evaluated over a broader period of time rather 
than as a snapshot”); see also Stein Testimony, supra note 32, at 2. 
 48. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ280/html/PLAW-109publ280.htm.  
 49. See Lustig, supra note 47 (“Pension regulations on plan terminations could also mean that 
improved funding levels are a catalyst for such steps, while increases in pension insurance premiums 
might help push the de-risking tide as well . . . .”).  
 50. See Rick Baert, Pension Buyouts Expected to Surge—But Not Yet, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.pionline.com/article/20131014/PRINT/310149973/ 
pension-buyouts-expected-to-surge-8212-but-not-yet. For example, in October 2013, the cost of 
purchasing annuities from an insurer decreased to 108.3% of the value of transferred liabilities. See 
Kevin Olsen, Mercer: Buyout vs. Economic Cost of Pension Funds at Smallest Margin in 2013, 
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Nov. 27, 2013, 1:28 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20131127/ 
ONLINE/131129884/mercer-buyout-vs-economic-cost-of-pension-funds-at-smallest-margin-in-2013 
(based on Mercer’s U.S. Pension Buyout Index). As of December 2014, the cost of purchasing 
annuities from an insurer further decreased to 105.3%. See Rob Kozlowski, Mercer: Pension Annuity 
Buyout Premium Decreases Relative to Liability, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Jan. 30, 2015, 3:24 PM), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20150130/ONLINE/150139987/mercer-pension-annuity-buyout-
premium-decreases-relative-to-liability. 
 51. Brendan McFarland, Retirement Plan Types of Fortune 100 Companies in 2012, TOWERS 
WATSON (Oct. 2012), http://www.aztreasury.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/1609_final_report/ 
Towers_Waston_annual_survey_of_Fortune_100_companies.pdf. The number of Fortune 100 
companies that have been offering only defined contribution plans has risen, and in 2012, only thirty 
Fortune 100 companies offered new hires some form of defined benefit plan. Id. “[O]nly [eleven] still 
offer[ed] a traditional [defined benefit] plan to new hires.” Id. (emphasis added).  
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transactions by their employers.
52
 Labor realities thus also favor a surge in 
pension de-risking activity. 
Because of these demographic, financial, and labor factors, DB plans 
pose little upside and lots of risk to employers who still maintain them.
53
 
As a result, where feasible and cost-effective, companies will seek to 
offload these pension obligations through external pension de-risking 
transactions. The last several years show precisely that. 
In 2012, Ford, General Motors (“GM”), and Verizon all engaged in 
external pension de-risking transactions. Ford Motor Company offered 
lump sums to approximately 90,000 retirees and former employees as a 
way to reduce its significant pension liabilities.
54
 GM pursued a two-prong 
de-risking strategy, offering lump-sum buyouts to approximately 42,000 
beneficiaries and purchasing an annuity contract through Prudential for 
another 110,000 beneficiaries.
55
 And Verizon struck a $7.5 billion group 
annuity deal with Prudential by which Prudential assumed responsibility 
for approximately 41,000 Verizon pensioners.
56
  
In 2013, SPX Corporation announced a lump-sum and annuity-buyout 
transaction worth some $800 million, with Massachusetts Mutual Life 
Insurance Company as the primary counterparty.
57
 The SPX plan impacts 
both terminated vested employees and retirees, with the former being 
offered lump sums and the latter being forced to take the annuity buyout.
58
  
In 2014, Motorola and Bristol-Myers Squibb joined the external de-
risking club. Motorola transferred $3 billion of its pension liabilities to 
 
 
 52. See Thomas I.M. Gottheil, Not Part of the Bargain: Worker Centers and Labor Law in 
Sociohistorical Context, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2228, 2229 (2014) (footnotes omitted) (“From 1973 to 
2013, union density declined from 24.0% to 11.2% of all employed workers and from 24.2% to 6.7% 
of private sector workers.”).  
 53. See Alex Pekker & Meghan Elwell, Pension Funds Should Derisk Now, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS (Mar. 11, 2014, 10:02 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20140311/ONLINE/ 
140319974/pension-funds-should-derisk-now (“[E]ven plan sponsors that appear to be fully derisked 
with completely frozen, fully funded and fully hedged plans with respect to interest rate risk should be 
prepared to fund mortality improvements and actuarial experience risk.”). 
 54. Meier, supra note 13. At the end of 2011, Ford had significant pension liabilities 
(approximately $74 billion globally) and an underfunded plan (an approximately $15.4 billion deficit). 
Id.  
 55. See GM Announces U.S. Salaried Pension Plan Actions, supra note 13.  
 56. Lee v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 2012 WL 6089041, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2012). 
 57. See Kevin Olsen, SPX Offloads $800 Million in Pension Risk; MassMutual to Take Portion 
in Buyout, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Nov. 14, 2013, 3:50 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/ 
20131114/ONLINE/131119925. 
 58. Id. Industry press has described insurance companies jockeying for position in the growing 
de-risking space. Id.  
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Prudential.
59
 Motorola also offered lump-sum buyouts to about 32,000 
terminated vested plan participants.
60
 Bristol-Myers Squibb engaged in a 
$1.4 billion annuitization transaction with Prudential, which affected about 
8,000 plan participants in pay status.
61
  
Indeed, external pension de-risking activity in the past few years has 
been so substantial that the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Advisory 
Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans (“ERISA 
Advisory Council”) moved to investigate the phenomenon.62 Given 
pension de-risking’s increased prominence, both in government circles and 
in industry press, considered suggestions for regulatory action are 
particularly timely.  
II. DE-RISKING & RETIREMENT SECURITY 
A. Performance & Delivery 
Central to pension regulation are two objectives: first, that pension 
promises made are actually performed, and second, that the pension 
promises that are performed actually deliver the socially desirable 
outcome they are supposed to: namely, retirement security. Neither of 
those rationales favors permissive pension de-risking.  
On the question of performance: employment-based retirement 
promises can come in a variety of different forms. Whatever their form, 
however, society desires that retirement promises be kept, because workers 
 
 
 59. Newman, supra note 13. The transfer is third to GM and Verizon, whose pension liability 
transfers equaled $25 billion and $7.5 billion, respectively. Id. The annuity contract affects some 
30,000 plan participants who are currently in pay status. Id.  
 60. Rob Kozlowski, Motorola Wraps Up Pension Buyout at Light Speed, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.pionline.com/article/20140929/PRINT/309299976/ 
motorola-wraps-up-pension-buyout-at-light-speed. At the end of the de-risking transactions, Motorola 
is hoping to have cut its pension liabilities in half. Id. Motorola’s current pension plan liabilities total 
approximately $8.4 billion. Id.  
 61. Steyer, supra note 13. At the end of 2013, the Bristol-Myers Squibb plan was actually about 
102.4% funded. Id. However, the company entered into the transaction with the hopes of being able to 
better manage the cost of maintaining the defined benefit plan. Id.  
 62. “Section 512 of ERISA provides for the establishment of an Advisory Council on Employee 
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, known as the ERISA Advisory Council,” to advise the Secretary 
of Labor. ERISA Advisory Council, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/ 
erisa_advisory_council.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). The Council reported its findings and 
recommendations to the Secretary of Labor in November 2013. See COUNCIL DE-RISKING REPORT, 
supra note 30. The Council is revisiting the topic in 2015 with its report and recommendations on 
Model Notices and Disclosures on Pension Risk Transfers. See ERISA Advisory Council, supra. 
Professor Maher provided testimony to the Council in August 2013, see Maher Testimony, supra note 
23, and Professor Secunda served as part of the Council’s Issue Drafting Group on Pension De-
Risking, see COUNCIL DE-RISKING REPORT, supra note 30.  
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are acutely vulnerable when they are not.
63
 All else equal, legal rules 
should promote pension promise performance.  
On the question of delivery: assuming a retirement promise is 
performed, society wants such retirement promises to be effective in 
yielding retirement security. Assuming both Retirement Promise A and 
Retirement Promise B will be performed, the more desirable promise is 
the one that leads to greater retirement security. All else equal, legal rules 
should disfavor pension promises that are comparatively less likely to 
promote retirement security. 
None of the above is particularly controversial, although it is routinely 
forgotten as interest groups and litigants furiously battle over the meaning 
of obscure provisions of both ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. This 
appears to be happening with respect to pension de-risking. If we take a 
step back, however, much of the pension de-risking debates can be 
concisely crystallized. If pension de-risking is permissively regulated, 
ERISA Annuities are likely to be converted into Non-ERISA Annuities or 
Non-ERISA Lump Sums; if pension de-risking is strictly regulated, they 
are unlikely to be converted. Most observers who favor strict regulation do 
so (1) because they believe converting ERISA Annuities into Non-ERISA 
Annuities is undesirable because the latter promise is less likely to be 
performed than an ERISA Annuity promise, or (2) because they believe 
that converting ERISA Annuities into Non-ERISA Lump Sums will 
deliver less retirement security than an ERISA Annuity promise.
64
 In Parts 
II.B and II.C below, we explain why those beliefs are likely justified and 
should form the basis for regulatory action.  
 
 
 63. See Paul M. Secunda, An Analysis of the Treatment of Employee Pension and Wage Claims 
in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes in OECD Countries: Comparative Law Lessons for 
Detroit and the United States, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 867, 872 (2014) (discussing the vulnerability of 
employees and pensioners as unsecured creditors among other, more sophisticated creditors during 
employer insolvencies). 
 64. Proponents of permissive de-risking either (1) deny that de-risking leads to a degradation of 
promise performance or retirement security, see, e.g., Private Sector Pension De-risking and 
Participant Protections: Hearing Before the ERISA Advisory Council 1–2 (June 5, 2013) (statement of 
John G. Ferreira, Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf 
/morganlewis060513.pdf (explaining that there is no need for further regulations and guidance of de-
risking transactions, and that such transactions actually benefit plan participants in numerous ways), or 
(2) argue that such a degradation is acceptable because it is outweighed by some other value, see, e.g., 
Newman Testimony, supra note 10, at 6 (explaining that de-risking transactions should be permitted 
because they enable employers to reduce the financial volatility stemming from legacy plans in order 
to more effectively manage on-going plan costs, especially in light of the fact that these plans are 
voluntary to begin with).  
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B. Non-ERISA Annuities: An Under-performance Problem 
A Non-ERISA Annuity promise is less likely to be performed than an 
ERISA Annuity promise because the former lacks regulatory features that 
make performance likely. Three features are particularly crucial. First, 
ERISA requires that DB plans meet minimum funding requirements.
65
 A 
pension promise does not by its nature require that any money be set aside 
today, but ERISA requires that future pensions be funded in advance (at 
levels determined by statute and dependent upon certain actuarial 
assumptions).
66
 Second, as a matter of federal law, ERISA imposes strict 
fiduciary duties upon plan fiduciaries, requiring that those who manage the 
plan act prudently and in the best interest of beneficiaries.
67
 Third, through 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, ERISA insures (up to a certain 
level of benefits) DB pensions.
68
 All of these requirements obviously 
increase the likelihood that the ERISA Annuity promise will be 
performed.  
When an ERISA Annuity is converted into a Non-ERISA Annuity, 
however, these safeguards vanish. They vanish because converting ERISA 
Annuities into Non-ERISA Annuities is achieved by effectively 
transacting beneficiaries out of ERISA (and the guarantees of the PBGC). 
If “[t]he entire benefit rights of the individual (1) [a]re fully guaranteed by 
an [insurer] licensed to do business in a State, and are legally enforceable 
by the sole choice of the individual against the [insurer]; and (2) [a 
contract] describing the benefits to which the individual is entitled under 
the plan has been issued to the individual,”69 the beneficiary is thereafter 
“not a participant covered under an employee pension plan.”70 
Beneficiaries are thereafter protected by state, rather than federal, law.
71
 
 
 
 65. 29 U.S.C. § 1083 (2014); Tucker, supra note 29, at 167.  
 66. See Tucker, supra note 29, at 168–69 (explaining that employers fund defined benefit plans 
through annual contributions that are recommended by actuaries based on the number of employees, 
the age of the plan participants, and the benefits that are to be paid to plan participants).  
 67. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2014); Tucker, supra note 29, at 195.  
 68. Guaranteed Benefits, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/ 
benefits/guaranteed-benefits.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). “The 2016 maximum monthly guarantee 
for a 65-year-old retiree is $5,011.36 which amounts to about $60,136 per year.” Id. The PBGC is 
funded by premiums paid by DB plans.  
 69. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(d)(2)(ii) (2016). 
 70. Id.  
 71. As Justice Scalia observed, when terminating a plan through the purchase of annuities, “[t]he 
assets of the plan are wholly removed from the ERISA system, and plan participants and beneficiaries 
must rely primarily (if not exclusively) on state contract remedies if they do not receive proper 
payments or are otherwise denied access to their funds.” Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 106 
(2007). 
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Although state law varies, in the main, state rules designed to ensure 
the full payment of annuity contracts are less protective than ERISA:
72
 
(1) the funding requirements for annuities are less demanding than 
ERISA;
73
 (2) the legal obligations governing those who manage the assets 
funding the annuity contracts are more permissive than ERISA;
74
 and 
(3) the backstop guarantees offered by state guaranty associations may be, 
at least in some circumstances, not as robust as those offered by the 
PBGC.
75
 This is not to say that in every case converting an ERISA 
Annuity into a Non-ERISA Annuity will have an appreciably negative 
effect on the likelihood of performance, but in general, it will reduce the 
likelihood of full performance. 
C. Non-ERISA Lump Sums: An Under-delivery Problem 
In pure mathematical terms, any annuity can be converted to an 
actuarially equivalent lump sum.
76
 Of course, if one uses unrealistic 
actuarial assumptions to convert an annuity into a lump sum, then one can 
rob the beneficiary of value. Obviously, these conversions need to be 
properly regulated.  
 
 
 72. Not everyone agrees that state protections for annuities are significantly worse than the 
federal protections of ERISA and the PBGC. See Private Sector Pension De-Risking and Participant 
Protections: Hearing Before the ERISA Advisory Council 12–13 (Aug. 29, 2013) (statement of Peter 
Gallanis, President, NOLHGA), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/NOLHGA082913.pdf 
[hereinafter Gallanis Testimony] (testifying that both DB plans—through ERISA rules and PBGC 
protections—and insurer annuities—through insurance regulation and the protections provided by 
insurance receivers and guaranty associations—offer robust protection to participants, though the 
systems for providing such protections are quite different and somewhat difficult to compare on an 
apples-to-apples basis). Obviously, state law varies. In our view, although it is possible for a state’s 
protections (and its guaranty body) to be as robust or nearly as robust as ERISA and the PBGC, the 
ERISA DB regime generally is more protective of beneficiaries than State X’s annuity regime. That is 
why our annuitization proposals call for an independent and impartial analysis of the latter. See infra 
Part III.C.2. 
 73. See Private Sector Pension De-Risking and Participant Protections: Hearing Before the 
ERISA Advisory Council 2 (Aug. 29, 2013) (statement of William Kadereit, President, National Retiree 
Legislative Network), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/NRLN082913.pdf (discussing how the 
annuity contracts cause participants to lose the minimum funding protections under ERISA for 
qualified plans).  
 74. See id. (discussing how the fiduciary and disclosure requirements under ERISA do not apply 
to annuity contracts that are purchased in plan de-risking transactions).  
 75. But see Gallanis Testimony, supra note 72, at 12–13 (testifying that while the floor level of 
guaranty association guaranteed benefits may, for some retirees, be lower than the PBGC’s 
comparable “hard cap,” that floor level is invariably augmented by significant assets from an insurer’s 
insolvency estate; in many cases, the combination will result in a higher level of protection for an 
annuity owner than for a similarly situated participant in a failed DB plan).  
 76. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining actuarial equivalence between lump 
sums and annuities). 
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But let us assume for the sake of argument that the conversions will be 
actuarially fair.
77
 Should regulators be indifferent between a beneficiary 
holding an ERISA Annuity or an actuarially equivalent Non-ERISA Lump 
Sum? The weight of the evidence—as well as behavioral economic 
theory—suggests not. In terms of delivering retirement security, annuities 
are vastly preferable to lump sums. 
Consider first the traditional definition of retirement security: that an 
individual will receive, for the balance of her retirement, income equal to 
approximately 70% of her income while employed.
78
 An ERISA Annuity 
naturally throws off income, is calculated based on the beneficiary’s 
working salary, and lasts for the duration of the beneficiary’s life.79 The 
beneficiary need do no more than, upon retirement, cash their monthly 
check until death.  
In contrast, for a lump sum to provide retirement security, matters are 
more complicated for the beneficiary. A lump sum received mid-career 
can be thought of as a conversion to a DC plan, where the initial 
contribution is the lump-sum actuarial equivalent of the ERISA Annuity 
earned to date. To understand the problem of de-risking an ERISA 
Annuity into a Non-ERISA Lump Sum, let us briefly review the problems 
associated with DC arrangements in general.  
For DC plans to “work” from a societal perspective, participants must 
habitually save at the appropriate rate, they must earn an appropriate 
investment return on those savings, and they must consume that balance, 
post-employment, at an appropriate rate. Put more concretely, for a DC 
participant to have assets sufficient to fund retirement income equal to 
some W% of this career wage, that worker must (1) annually save X% of 
this compensation, (2) earn Y% in investment appreciation on those 
savings, and (3) draw down those savings at Z% a year in retirement. 
Many workers have proved unable to do those things.
80
 Put differently, 
 
 
 77. This is not to imply that all actuarial conversions undertaken in the real world are actuarially 
fair. To the contrary, much litigation on precisely this issue occurs. We are simply assuming 
actuarially fair conversions for the sake of argument. Put differently, even if all conversions were 
actuarially fair, there would still be a problem. 
 78. Top 10 Ways to Prepare for Retirement, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/ 
publications/10_ways_to_prepare.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
 79. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text; see also Befort, supra note 1, at 946 
(“Traditional defined benefit plans provide a predetermined, specified retirement benefit, usually in the 
form of a life annuity, linked to pre-retirement earnings.”). 
 80. See generally Stabile, supra note 37; see also Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of 
the Social Security Administration, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 329–31 (2007) (describing how many 
Americans are financially illiterate and have psychological biases that may adversely affect the 
numerous and complex decisions they have to make in the context of defined contribution plans). 
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DC participants: (1) do not save enough of their current income; (2) do not 
optimally invest their savings; and (3) do not properly manage post-
employment longevity risk, that is, they spend their DC savings too 
quickly.
81
 For many workers, then, the stark reality is that DC plans have 
under-delivered retirement security.
82
  
Precisely why DC plans have under-delivered is subject to intense 
scholarly debate.
83
 We do not resolve that debate here, although we side 
with the majority of scholars to have considered the issue. We believe, as 
do most observers, that DC plans have failed because they transferred to 
unsophisticated and unprepared individuals the responsibility for making 
saving, investment, and longevity decisions. And those individuals have 
made poor choices.
84
  
There is no longer any serious doubt that human beings—even 
educated human beings—are naturally inclined to, and systematically do, 
behave sub-optimally.
85
 (By sub-optimally, we mean that, given some 
plausible assumptions about what most people prefer, individuals make 
choices that fail to maximize those preferences.) The rich literature of 
behavioral economics has identified and categorized the many ways in 
which individuals’ choices are afflicted with “cognitive biases” that result 
in poor decision making.
86
  
 
 
 81. For example, it is estimated that participants in defined contribution plans, such as 401(k)s, 
who expect to maintain their standard of living will need to save approximately 17% of the income 
they earn from age twenty-five to sixty-six. Ghilarducci, supra note 1, at 454. Yet plan participants in 
401(k) plans are only contributing approximately 7.5 to 8% of their income. Amy B. Monahan, 
Employers as Risks, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 757 (2014); see also 4 Disastrous Retirement 
Mistakes and How to Avoid Them, MONEY.COM, http://time.com/money/3546592/ira-rollover-
mistakes-retirement/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (providing an example of how employees go through 
retirement money too fast). 
 82. See Bradford, supra note 1 (“Roughly 31% of Americans have no retirement savings and no 
access to defined benefit plans, according to Federal Reserve data, including 19% of people ages 55 to 
64. Of the 65% of private-sector workers with access to workplace retirement plans, only 48% 
participated in one in 2014.”).  
 83. Compare Bradford, supra note 1 (discussing how many people do not have access to private-
sector retirement plans, and those plans that people do have access to are not that beneficial), with 
McClendon, supra note 5, at 828 (discussing how defined contribution plans do not provide for a set 
benefit at retirement, and do not guarantee plan participants “significant benefit accruals”), and 
Stabile, supra note 37, at 88–89 (discussing how many plan participants lack the financial knowledge 
and literacy needed to make important investment decisions that are required by defined contribution 
plans). 
 84. See sources cited supra note 82. 
 85. Admittedly, this question can become contentious on the specifics: what do most people 
prefer, and how do we know what that is? We do not here attempt to resolve that question; instead, we 
merely assert a largely but not entirely uncontroversial point: most people wish to have retirement 
income equal to some reasonable percentage, say 70%, of their employment income, for the duration 
of their retired lives. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 86. See generally, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (discussing and 
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Many of those cognitive biases threaten wise retirement planning. For 
example, individuals generally value the present more than they should 
and are overly optimistic about the future.
87
 These individuals are prone to 
spend too much today and save too little for retirement.
88
 Second, there is 
a tendency to procrastinate, which means that individuals tend to put off 
saving for retirement or making difficult choices regarding retirement 
planning.
89
 Many people, without a nudge, will fail to enroll in a 
retirement savings program at all. Even if they are automatically enrolled, 
they tend to stick with plan default options and contribution levels.
90
  
Compounding such cognitive biases are more traditional obstacles to 
making rational retirement decisions, such as lack of financial literacy. An 
oft-cited survey of financial literacy revealed that only 14% of Americans 
could answer five extremely simple questions about interest rates and 
diversification.
91
 Even when financially literate, DC participants face high 
information costs compared to their DB plan counterparts. A DC plan 
participant needs to gather and evaluate a significant amount of 
information in order to make informed decisions; a DB participant does 
not.
92
 In order to combat the high information costs associated with DC 
plan decision making, plan participants end up using “mental shortcuts” or 
“heuristics” which lead to poor investment decisions.93  
 
 
cataloguing cognitive biases). 
 87. See Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay: 
Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53, 75 (2012) (“There is 
extensive evidence . . . that humans tend to excessively weigh costs and benefits in the present and 
very near future at the expense of those that are more distant.”).  
 88. Id. at 75–76 (“[T]he time and mental effort of choosing a retirement plan looms much larger 
than the budget crunch one will face at retirement from choosing the wrong plan.”). 
 89. See Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, 
and the "SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 819–23 (2008). 
 90. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 74–102 (rev. ed. 2009); Brendan S. Maher, Some Thoughts on 
Health Care Exchanges: Choice, Defaults, and the Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099, 1112 (2012) 
(“A regulator can choose a default such that a person can ‘one-click’ for default coverage of a 
specified quality and price, and make the default option a prominent option of the exchange website.”); 
Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV 1155, 1161–73 (2013) 
(explaining why individuals are reluctant to depart from certain default rules). 
 91. MEDILL, supra note 34, at 570–71 (citing 2012 findings from United States Department of 
the Treasury’s National Financial Capability Study of 25,000 American adults, available at 
http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/about.php).  
 92. See Medill, supra note 80, at 327 (explaining how defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) 
plans, “make[] the individual worker primarily responsible for funding his or her own retirement 
benefits and investing his or her retirement plan assets”).  
 93. Id. at 333–34. Some of the negative impacts of plan participants’ mental shortcuts include 
overinvesting in company stock, relying on their own aversion to risk and investing too conservatively, 
and allocating their plan assets proportionately. Id. at 334–35.  
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In the past thirty years, occupational pensions have shifted from DB-
dominated to DC-dominated. Private sector worker participation in DB 
plans dropped from 62% in 1975 to 7% in 2009.
94
 Conversely, worker 
participation in DC plans rose from 16% in 1975 to 67% in 2009.
95
 In that 
same time frame, retirement security has eroded. For example, the 
percentage of workers who were “at risk of having inadequate funds to 
maintain their lifestyle through retirement” increased from 31% in 1983 to 
roughly 53% in 2010.
96
 Indeed, a wealth of data shows how DC plans 
have failed to deliver retirement security.
97
  
The same problems that afflict DC plans generally will afflict 
beneficiaries who receive Non-ERISA Lump Sums instead of ERISA 
Annuities: they will have problems in optimally saving, managing, and 
spending the lump sum over the course of their lifetimes.
98
 Indeed, the de-
risking problem is worse. Traditional DC plans, first, are governed by 
ERISA, which means that the plan sponsor may retain some residual 
responsibility for providing a sensible menu of investment options for 
monies contained within the plan.
99
 Non-ERISA Lump Sums, in contrast, 
can be used imprudently by beneficiaries much more easily. Second, to the 
 
 
 94. EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2001.pdf. Other statistics show 
that in 1975, defined benefit plans accounted for one-third of all pension plans in the nation. Estreicher 
& Gold, supra note 2, at 331. By 1998, defined benefit plans accounted for only one-twelfth of all 
pension plans. Id. at 331–32. In 2011, that number dropped further to about one-sixteenth. See 
MEDILL, supra note 34, at 131. 
 95. EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., supra note 94, at 4. In 2011, the number of defined contribution 
plans outnumbered defined benefit plans fourteen to one. See MEDILL, supra note 34, at 131. 
 96. Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 3, at 1152.  
 97. According to a 2014 Employee Benefit Research Institute (“EBRI”) retirement confidence 
survey, about a quarter of Americans are not at all confident in their retirement savings, and an 
additional 37% are only somewhat confident. Press Release, Emp. Benefit Research Inst., EBRI’s 
2014 Retirement Confidence Survey: Confidence Rebounds—for Those with Retirement Plans 1 (Mar. 
18, 2014), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/surveys/rcs/2014/PR1066.RCS.18Mar14.pdf. Worker 
retirement savings remain low, according to the survey, and not many Americans are taking even basic 
steps towards preparing for retirement. Id. While many American workers realize that they need to 
bolster their retirement savings, many have not even tried to estimate the savings that they will need in 
order to live comfortably during retirement, and only about one in five workers have obtained financial 
advice to assist in retirement planning. Id. at 2. However, of those workers who have sought out and 
obtained financial advice, only 27% of those workers admitted to completely following the advice of 
the financial planner, while the rest have only followed some or most of the advice. Id. 
 98. For already retired beneficiaries who receive lump sums, then there will be no “saving” 
problem, but investment and consumption problems will remain. 
 99. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2014); see also ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES 10 (2014), available at http://www.dol.gov/ 
ebsa/pdf/2014ACreport3.pdf (“Lou Campagna of the Department’s Employee Benefit Security 
Administration (‘EBSA’) testified that he did not believe that the Department has ever addressed this 
particular question, but provided his personal view that the designation of the named fiduciary in the 
plan document may itself be a fiduciary act.”). 
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extent a de-risked beneficiary is not simultaneously enrolled in the 
employer’s DC plan, the beneficiary loses a key advantage of most 
workplace plans: default savings.
100
  
III. THINKING ABOUT REFORM 
A. The Comparative Strength of Regulators 
ERISA does not require that employers offer retirement benefits; it 
merely regulates retirement benefit promises that are made.
101
 Because of 
the voluntary nature of retirement promises, regulators are often faced 
with a difficult choice: if the legal rules are too protective of beneficiaries 
or too burdensome to employers, fewer retirement promises will be made 
in the first place. Thus, regulators—even if they have great discretion to 
act—must generally be quite cognizant of ensuring that promulgating 
protective rules for beneficiaries will not significantly undermine plan 
creation.
102
  
In the pension de-risking context, however, that pressure barely exists. 
De-risking applies only to DB promises already made; those promises 
cannot be abandoned because sponsors believe de-risking rules are too 
protective of beneficiaries. Nor will strong rules undermine the creation of 
new DB plans; as we have emphasized, other forces have contributed to 
the steady decline of such plans.
103
 No employer will be deterred from 
offering a DB plan because of strict rules against de-risking because 
virtually no employers are offering new DB plans in the first place.
104
 
Accordingly, there is little pressure on regulators to balance the 
objective of “DB plan creation” against the goal of “promulgating rules 
protecting DB beneficiaries from de-risking.” The former will continue to 
deteriorate irrespective of the latter.  
In considering reform, regulators should be guided by a single 
principle: de-risking should make pension plan beneficiaries no worse off 
than if the transaction never occurred. That principle, incidentally, is not 
 
 
 100. See MEDILL, supra note 34, at 124 (“In a traditional 401(k) plan, . . . the plan participants 
individually direct the employer to contribute part of their current compensation to their plan accounts 
rather than receiving this amount as present compensation.”).  
 101. See Regina T. Jefferson, Increasing Coverage in Today’s Private Retirement System, 6 
DREXEL L. REV. 463, 464 (2014) (noting voluntary nature of retirement promises). 
 102. Tucker, supra note 29, at 225 (“ERISA's objective of protecting the rights and benefits of 
plan participants also includes avoiding undue administrative burdens on employers and preserving 
employers’ right to customize plans.”). 
 103. See supra Part I.D. 
 104. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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foreign to pension regulation. For example, in the merger context, ERISA 
requires that a “pension plan may not merge . . . unless each participant in 
the plan would (if the plan then terminated) receive a benefit immediately 
after the merger . . . which is equal to or greater than the benefit he would 
have been entitled to receive immediately before the merger.”105 So, at the 
outset, we propose that the DOL adopt a similar “no worse off” mindset in 
regulating de-risking transactions. 
B. Legal Framework for De-risking 
As we explained in Part II, external de-risking processes can be 
conceived of as either “annuitization” or “lump-sum” transactions. In this 
section we consider the legal rules that govern both forms of external de-
risking and also briefly consider the law governing internal de-risking. 
Annuitization. Annuitization refers to a plan transferring its liabilities to 
an annuity provider; former plan beneficiaries become claimants on the 
annuity provider.
106
 In external annuitizations, the new risk-bearers are the 
annuity provider and the beneficiaries, to the extent any failure by the 
annuity provider is not covered by a state guarantee.
107
  
ERISA itself has long contemplated that terminated DB plans will 
convert their outstanding liabilities to Non-ERISA Annuities.
108
 More 
recently, annuitization has been used by plan sponsors in non-termination 
settings. Either way, external annuitization transacts beneficiaries out of 
ERISA (and the guarantees of the PBGC).
109
 Beneficiaries are thereafter 
protected by state, rather than federal, law.
110
 
The legal framework for annuitization is informed by ERISA itself and 
the judge-made “settlor” doctrine. Regrettably, neither the settlor 
doctrine’s boundaries, nor how de-risking maps onto it, are perfectly clear.  
It is well known that ERISA was inspired by and draws heavily upon 
the law of trusts.
111
 Indeed, ERISA’s drafters conceived of ERISA plans as 
 
 
 105. 29 U.S.C. § 1058 (2014). 
 106. Such describes “external” annuitization. See supra Part I.C. “Internal” annuitization, in 
contrast, is when the plan simply uses annuities as a plan asset that will help match plan cash flows to 
plan benefit liabilities. See supra Part I.B. 
 107. See Newman Testimony, supra note 10, at 2, 4.  
 108. See id. at 2 (discussing how Non-ERISA annuity purchases are made when plan terminates).  
 109. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3 (2016). 
 110. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250 (2000); 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999) (“[T]rust law may offer a ‘starting point’ 
for analysis in some situations . . . .”); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996); see also 
Michael J. Collins, It’s Common, but Is it Right? The Common Law of Trusts in ERISA Fiduciary 
Litigation, 16 LAB. LAW. 391, 391 (2001) (“The common law of trusts served as the basis for ERISA’s 
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statutory cousins of common-law trusts.
112
 A common-law trust is created 
by a settlor, and trust law contains specific rules respecting the prerogative 
and judicial treatment of settlors.  
Whether ERISA plans—which, unlike most trusts, are not donative—
may appropriately be thought of as having a true “settlor” has long been 
debated by scholars.
113
 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has been 
persuaded that certain acts by plan sponsors are best conceived of as 
“settlor” actions akin to those that would have been taken by the “settlor” 
of a trust. Settlor actions, by command of the Supreme Court, are not 
subject to ERISA’s fiduciary duties, although they are subject to explicitly 
enumerated ERISA requirements.
114
 Importantly, a plan amendment is an 
act that falls within the settlor exception,
115
 and annuitizations are done via 
plan amendment.
116
 
While the choice to annuitize is a protected settlor function, 
implementing that choice is not. All ERISA fiduciaries are obligated to 
follow a plan’s terms (unless such terms conflict with ERISA), and are 
likewise obligated to act with the care a prudent person would display in 
carrying out those terms.
117
 Furthermore, all fiduciaries must act loyally—
they must act “solely” for the interests of beneficiaries and for the 
“exclusive purpose” of providing benefits to participants.118 Although 
these duties are explicitly set forth in ERISA, the content of those duties 
has been defined by both regulation and judicial opinion; agency officials 
and judges, however, do not always concur. 
 
 
fiduciary duty provisions, and courts have often applied the common law of trusts in interpreting 
ERISA’s fiduciary rules.”). 
 112. See Collins, supra note 111, at 395 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 295 (1974)) 
(“ERISA’s legislative history makes clear that Title I is intended to ‘apply rules and remedies similar 
to those under traditional trust law to govern the conduct of fiduciaries.’”).  
 113. See generally Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of 
the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459 (2015) (providing overview of long-
running debate over meaning of settlor/fiduciary distinction under ERISA). 
 114. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 530–32; Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at 444; Lockheed Corp. 
v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890–91 (1996).  
 115. See Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at 444 (describing how the fiduciary duty requirements 
under ERISA are not implicated where the plan sponsor made an amendment to the plan); Lockheed 
Corp., 517 U.S. at 891 (describing how the plan sponsor was acting “not as a fiduciary but as a settlor 
when it amended the terms of the Plan” to include a specific provision).  
 116.  See Private Sector Pension De-Risking and Participant Protections: Hearing Before the 
ERISA Advisory Council 2 (June 5, 2013) (statement of Stephen A. Keating, Co-Founder and 
Principal, Penbridge Advisors, LLC), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/penbridge 
advisors060513.pdf (“[T]he decision to amend a plan to distribute benefits as annuity contracts is a 
settlor decision, not governed by ERISA’s fiduciary obligations and not subject to fiduciary review.”).  
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2014).  
 118. Id.  
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In 1995, the DOL issued an Interpretative Bulletin explaining that 
“[t]he selection of an annuity provider for purposes of a pension benefit 
distribution . . . is a fiduciary decision governed by the provisions of part 4 
of title I of ERISA.”119 Fiduciaries must select the “safest annuity 
available, unless under the circumstances it would be in the interests of 
participants and beneficiaries to do otherwise.”120 A fiduciary must not 
solely rely “on ratings provided by insurance rating services”; the entire 
mix of relevant circumstances need be objectively and thoroughly 
considered, including such factors as “the quality and diversification of the 
annuity provider’s investment portfolio, . . . the size of the insurer relative 
to the proposed contract, . . . [and] the availability of additional protection 
through state guaranty associations and the extent of their guarantees.”121  
At least one federal court of appeals has rejected the Department’s 
view that fiduciaries are presumptively obligated to select the safest 
annuity available. The Fifth Circuit has held that fiduciaries, in selecting 
annuities, are simply obligated to follow the exclusive benefit rule (i.e., to 
select annuity providers “with an eye single to the interests of the 
participants and beneficiaries”).122 The implication of the Fifth Circuit’s 
view is that fiduciaries need afford less weight to choosing “safe” 
annuities than the Department of Labor believes is presumptively 
appropriate. 
For its part, Congress was specifically concerned about annuitizations 
leaving beneficiaries worse off than they were under the plan. In 1994, 
Congress amended ERISA to provide a special cause of action to police 
improper behavior in annuitization transactions.
123
 Should a fiduciary 
violate his duties in connection with an annuitization, section 1132(a)(9) 
specifically provides a federal cause of action to beneficiaries to “assure 
receipt by the participant or beneficiary of the amounts” promised by the 
annuity issuer.
124
 While the scope of this provision is far from certain, it 
reveals Congressional intent that beneficiaries “may sue and recover 
money damages from their employers or other fiduciaries so that they can 
at least receive the amounts that were promised by the insurance contract 
or annuity, plus reasonable interest.”125 
 
 
 119. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1(c) (1995). 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 298 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Donovan v. 
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 123. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(9) (2014).  
 124. Id.  
 125. H.R. REP. NO. 103-872, at 43 (1994) (emphasis added). 
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Lump Sums. As we explained above, lump-sum de-risking refers to 
when the plan offers beneficiaries the right to receive, in lieu of their 
promised pension annuity, a lump sum that is equivalent to the net present 
value of their defined benefit.
126
 Lump-sum de-risking is thus commonly 
described as a “lump-sum buyout.” 
Lump-sum buyouts are limited by both ERISA and the tax rules 
governing qualified plans.
127
 First, the permissible assumptions for 
converting the pension into a lump sum are regulated to promote 
actuarially fair conversions.
128
 Second, except for small entitlements, a 
beneficiary cannot be forced to take a lump sum—the beneficiary, and his 
or her spouse, must consent to receiving the pension in the form of a lump 
sum.
129
 Third, Treasury regulations constrain lump-sum payouts 
depending on whether the beneficiary is currently receiving benefits.
130
 
Fourth, lump-sum buyouts are only permissible if the plan is funded above 
a certain level.
131
 Fifth, a plan must provide a participant with certain 
information before a lump-sum election can be made.
132
 None of these 
regulations squarely address the concerns observers have about 
beneficiaries making poor choices when choosing a lump sum over the 
lifetime income stream a pension promises. 
Internal de-risking. The legal framework for internal de-risking 
strategies is largely the same as that governing the investment of plan 
 
 
 126. See supra Part II.C. 
 127. A plan is qualified, and thus entitled to favorable tax treatment, if it complies with the 
Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations. Edward W. Brankey & Frank P. Darr, Debtor 
Interests in Pension Plans as Property of the Debtor’s Estate, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 275, 279 (1990) 
(footnote omitted) (“Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code sets forth the rules for qualification 
of a plan.”). Only some plan qualification requirements are also required by ERISA. Id.  
 128. I.R.C. § 417(e) regulates the valuation of lump-sum payments. See, e.g., Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. Wilson N. Jones Mem'l Hosp., 374 F.3d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 2004) (“§ 417(e) [is] the 
statute which controls the valuation of lump sum plan benefit payments.”); Esden v. Bank of Bos., 229 
F.3d 154, 164 n.13 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the 1994 amendments to § 417(e) “added a statutory 
requirement that the Secretary prescribe an ‘applicable mortality table’ for converting annuities into 
lump-sums”); Kiefer v. Ceridian Corp., 976 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D. Minn. 1997) (“Section 417(e) of the 
Internal Revenue Code governs the interest rates plans can use to calculate lump sum benefits.”). 
 129. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(e) (2014) (beneficiary consent necessary for present value distribution); id. 
§ 1055(g) (2014) (spousal consent necessary for 1053(c) distribution). 
 130. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-6 (2014) (lump-sum buyout prohibited for beneficiaries in pay 
status unless an exception applies); see also supra note 33 (IRS Notice 2015-49 generally prohibits 
lump-sum offers to those in paid status).  
 131. See I.R.C. § 436(c)(1) (2014).  
 132. Treas. Reg. § 1.417(a)(3)–1 (2014). The disclosure requirements are tax regulations 
promulgated by Treasury that relate to qualified plans, and they have no direct counterpart under 
ERISA. ERISA’s fiduciary duties, however, require that administrators make any disclosures that a 
prudent person in like circumstances would make to beneficiaries. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) 
(2014) (noting ERISA’s fiduciary duty of prudence).  
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assets generally: fiduciaries need to observe duties of loyalty, prudence, 
diversification, and otherwise comply with the plan and ERISA.
133
 
Unclear, however—and therefore likely to give pause to fiduciaries 
considering engaging in internal de-risking transactions—is the likelihood 
of successful suits by plaintiffs unhappy about investment choices 
fiduciaries make (or do not make) in connection with pursuing internal de-
risking strategies. Consider, by way of example, a fiduciary who chooses 
to pursue an internal de-risking strategy by purchasing annuities that are 
held by the plan, for example, an internal annuitization. The premium 
associated with purchasing such annuities will be significant. Such a 
fiduciary might face claims from plaintiffs alleging that such a purchase 
violated, among other things, the fiduciary’s duty of prudence (i.e., by 
paying too high a price for the annuities, which are plan investments).
134
 
C. Proposals 
Regulators are not unconstrained. Both statutory language and existing 
regulations cabin, formally or practically, what reform-minded regulators 
may plausibly accomplish. There is, nonetheless, room for regulators to 
act. We offer four suggestions below. 
1. Promote Internal De-risking  
As we have emphasized, there are significant differences between 
“internal” and “external” de-risking. Internal de-risking is far less 
worrisome, because it can accomplish the goal of reducing a sponsor’s 
pension risk without undermining promise performance or the delivery of 
retirement security to beneficiaries. Where possible, then, regulators 
should promote internal de-risking strategies.  
When thinking about how to incentivize plan sponsors to try internal 
strategies, a “safe harbor” approach might make the most sense.135 
Although the law governing internal de-risking is generally settled,
136
 how 
it applies to particular de-risking choices is not. Fiduciaries uncertain 
about the permissibility of otherwise desirable internal de-risking 
strategies may choose to engage in otherwise undesirable external de-
 
 
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2014).  
 134. See, e.g., Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 299 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that under 
these circumstances, “the only open course of action may be to appoint an independent fiduciary”). 
 135. See COUNCIL DE-RISKING REPORT, supra note 30, at 25 (referring to a safe harbor proposal 
advanced by Professor Maher). 
 136. See supra Part I.B. 
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risking instead. One uncontroversial way to promote internal de-risking is 
to reduce litigation uncertainty associated with pursuing internal strategies. 
Accordingly, we suggest that if plans looking to de-risk were to pursue 
“internal” approaches that satisfy publicly available DOL guidelines, the 
Secretary should not pursue civil litigation against them and should 
oppose private plaintiffs who do.
137
 Alternatively, the DOL could urge 
Congress to amend ERISA to create a statutory safe harbor for particular 
internal de-risking approaches, like for appropriate LDI or hedging 
strategies. 
Although we believe safe harbors (or other regulatory encouragement) 
for internal de-risking is an appealing reform, we do not want to overstate 
the case. Candidly, it is wishful thinking to believe that encouraging 
internal de-risking alone will curb external de-risking. The temptation to 
externally de-risk is high; only external de-risks offload the pension 
obligation from the company’s books for good.138 Because external de-
risks will occur regardless of the regulatory inducements to internally de-
risk, serious reform must also directly regulate external de-risking 
strategies.  
2. Procedural Safeguards for Annuitization 
A primary concern with annuitization is that the participants holding 
Non-ERISA Annuities are less likely to receive the pension amounts they 
worked for years to obtain.
139
 More rigorous regulation of the 
annuitization process, however, could substantially reduce the risk that the 
resulting Non-ERISA Annuity will be under-performing.  
Current DOL regulations on selecting the annuity provider require the 
fiduciary implementing an annuitization strategy to select the “safest 
possible annuity” unless the interests of the beneficiaries would be served 
by not doing so.
140
 Although fiduciaries are charged by ERISA to act 
solely in the interest of beneficiaries, the reality is otherwise. It has long 
been recognized that many ERISA fiduciaries are, in practice, conflicted 
because they are employed, controlled, or beholden to the plan sponsor.
141
 
 
 
 137. See Maher Testimony, supra note 23, at 6.  
 138. See COUNCIL DE-RISKING REPORT, supra note 30, at 13 (observing that only external de-
risking “permanently discharg[es] the employer’s obligations”). 
 139. See discussion supra Part II.B.  
 140. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standards Under ERISA When Selecting 
an Annuity Provider for a Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1 (2014). 
 141. See Beverly Cohen, Divided Loyalties: How the Metlife v. Glenn Standard Discounts ERISA 
Fiduciaries’ Conflicts of Interest, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 955, 974 (“[V]irtually all ERISA plan benefit 
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In the de-risking setting, the conflict is particularly acute because plan 
assets above those needed to purchase an annuity that covers obligations to 
beneficiaries revert to the plan sponsor. The temptation is for the fiduciary 
to select an annuity that facially guarantees the proper amount of benefits 
to retirees, but saves the plan money by being riskier. Fiduciaries are also 
unlikely to competently scrutinize the health and applicability of the 
relevant state insurance guarantee fund, which is the backstop should the 
annuity provider fail. As the Great Recession taught us, even sophisticated 
players are inclined to inappropriately plan for catastrophic default when it 
is in their interest to do otherwise.
142
  
Problems with fiduciary decision-making can be reduced by the use of 
procedural safeguards.
143
 First, annuitizations should be subject to a 
bidding process in which at least three annuity providers are invited to 
submit proposals. Second, plan fiduciaries should be obligated to retain an 
independent state expert to prepare a written report on the fitness of the 
individual state guarantee funds that back each bidder. Third, once a 
winning bid has been chosen, an enrolled actuary should certify that the 
annuity chosen by the plan is—as compared to the annuity offered in the 
other bids and those available in the market generally—the “most 
protective annuity.” If the enrolled actuary is unable to so certify, then the 
plan should spell out in writing and make available to participants why, 
given these circumstances, it did not choose the “most protective annuity.” 
DOL regulations should provide that, absent unusual circumstances, 
compliance with these steps is the minimum requirement of a fiduciary’s 
discharge of its duties of loyalty and prudence. 
3. Disclosure Safeguards for Lump Sums 
Although the law currently requires that lump-sum offers to 
beneficiaries be actuarially equivalent to the promised ERISA Annuity, it 
does not require that the two forms of benefit be practically equivalent. 
Beneficiaries should be informed of the latter.  
 
 
claims are decided by fiduciaries that are conflicted to some extent (including employers, third-party 
administrators, and insurance companies providing the coverage) . . . .”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 120 (2008) (discussing how there is a conflict of interest in most ERISA cases).  
 142. See, e.g., Ian Salisbury & Paul J. Lim, 6 Years Later, 7 Lessons from Lehman’s Collapse, 
MONEY.COM (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.time.com/money/3330793/lessons-from-lehman-brothers-
collapse (discussing how a “venerable investment bank” filed for bankruptcy during the Great 
Recession in 2008).  
 143. Because the selection of an annuity provider is a fiduciary function (as opposed to a settlor 
function), the DOL has considerable freedom to promulgate regulations. See supra Part III.B.  
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First, while in theory a lump sum can be invested and drawn down 
periodically in such a way as to mimic an annuity, for a lump-sum 
distribution to replicate what an ERISA Annuity provides, the lump sum 
would have to be worth more than the net present value of the ERISA 
Annuity. Benefits are merely foregone wages, and a retiring worker 
entitled to an ERISA Annuity of $X per year has given up sufficient wages 
to pay for both (1) the right to receive $X until death and (2) the 
investment services of the plan to manage the assets underlying that 
promise. The latter is not costless, and converting an ERISA Annuity into 
a lump sum immediately deprives the beneficiary of the value of those 
already-paid-for investment services—services that she will have to 
replace using her own resources. Beneficiaries should be advised that 
investment services formerly provided by the plan (and already paid for by 
the employee) will now have to be borne by the employee. 
Second, beneficiaries should be advised of the dangers of investment 
and longevity risk. Individual money management is costly and risky, and 
poor management could leave a beneficiary without sufficient income in 
the later stages of old age. Clear, plain-English examples of longevity risk 
should be required to be provided to all beneficiaries presented with a 
lump-sum option. Beneficiaries should also specifically be informed 
that—because of the modest adverse selection that afflicts annuity 
markets—they might not be able to use their lump sum to later purchase 
an annuity on as favorable terms as they can get from the plan. In addition, 
although lump-sum elections require spousal consent,
144
 lump-sum 
disclosures should make clear that the investment and longevity risks 
facing the retiree apply with additional force to the retiree’s spouse. 
Because lump sums must be consented to by beneficiaries to be 
permissible, at the time of the election, the beneficiary is still owed 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence by the plan. The above 
disclosures should constitute the minimum necessary to satisfy such 
duties, and they should be codified by the Department of Labor. Tax 
regulations, which already provide for some disclosures—including 
disclosing the “financial effect” of electing an optional form of benefit—
should be likewise updated.
145
 
 
 
 144. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(g) (2014).  
 145. 26 C.F.R. § 1.417(a)(3)-1(c)(1)(iii) requires disclosure of the “financial effect” of electing an 
optional form of benefit, including a lump sum. Those regulations, however, are too narrow. They 
arguably limit “financial effect” to mean “the amounts and timing of payments to the participant under 
the form of benefit during the participant's lifetime, and the amounts and timing of payments after the 
death of the participant.” More information than that is needed to make a lump-sum disclosure 
meaningful.  
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4. Restricting Lump-Sum Distributions to Retirees 
Although improved disclosure is likely to reduce the number of lump-
sum elections, there is reason to fear that improved disclosures will be 
insufficient to prevent lump-sum elections that hurt beneficiaries. Because 
people generally overestimate their ability to invest wisely and overly 
discount their future needs, the temptation to irrationally favor the present, 
and thus a lump sum, is strong.
146
 And other individual factors might 
exacerbate the difficulty of making an optimal choice—beneficiaries 
making these choices could be operating at diminished capacity, for 
example.
147
 Yet, however high the likelihood that choosing a lump sum 
will, for many beneficiaries, be the “wrong” choice, political opposition to 
restricting that choice by regulation will likely be strong.  
There is good reason to believe, however, that ERISA and the Internal 
Revenue Code contemplate, if not require, government action to head off 
poor choices. ERISA itself requires that a lump sum occur as the result of 
the “consent” of the participant.148 Professor Norman Stein has suggested 
that “consent” implies more than simply a choice made after being 
presented with technically adequate disclosures; it implies a choice made 
only where the beneficiary actually understands the meaning and 
consequences of the options.
149
 Thus, in circumstances where the DOL has 
reason to believe the average plan participant is unlikely to truly 
understand the meaning of lump-sum disclosures, it could and should 
promulgate regulations that limit or even prohibit lump-sum buyouts 
absent some indication that “meaningful understanding” preceded the 
decision.
150
 One possibility for doing so is “performance-based” 
regulation, in which the governing regulation requires that the company’s 
disclosures lead to a specified level of consumer comprehension.
151
  
 
 
 146. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 147. See COUNCIL DE-RISKING REPORT, supra note 30, at 21 (maintaining that offering lump sums 
to seniors with diminished capacity amounts to “corporate elder abuse”). Stein “testified that, everyone 
besides those who are terminally ill, or almost everyone else who selects a lump sum, will be forfeiting 
a substantial portion of their retirement savings.” Id.  
 148. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(e) (2014) (“consent” required for lump-sum distributions over $5000); see 
also id. § 1055(g) (2014) (“consent in writing” required for 1053(e) election). 
 149. See generally Norman P. Stein, Pension Plan De-risking: Is It Bad, Is It Legal, Can It Be 
Stopped, Slowed or Moderated? (Mar. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), archived at 
http://perma.cc/NRH7-TBP9. 
 150. See infra note 152 (explaining how suitability standard will help police lump-sum offers 
made to beneficiaries not in paid status). 
 151.  See generally Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1309 (2015). 
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A related approach would be to adopt a suitability or “know your 
customer rule” that the Securities & Exchange Commission, for example, 
used in the past to regulate broker-customer relationships. Although now 
rescinded, that suitability rule required: 
Every nonmember broker or dealer and every associated person 
who recommends to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of 
any security shall have reasonable grounds to believe that the 
recommendation is not unsuitable for such customer on the basis of 
information furnished by such customer after reasonable inquiry 
concerning the customer's investment objectives, financial situation 
and needs, and any other information known by such broker or 
dealer or associated person.
152
 
The DOL could establish by regulation that plan fiduciaries consider 
whether a lump sum is not suitable for retirees in paid status because of 
that person’s “investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and 
any other information known” to the fiduciary.153 The fiduciary would not 
need to be prescient in such matters; only make a reasonable inquiry 
before offering the lump sum to the retiree. Such a rule would help many 
retirees avoid making a monumental mistake with their retirement savings.  
CONCLUSION 
Because previously-promised DB pensions have been an expensive and 
uncertain proposition for many employers, it is not surprising that they 
have responded by seeking to offload their pension obligations to 
insurance companies or individuals. That such employer maneuvering is 
understandable, however, does not mean it advances the social goal of 
retirement security. To the contrary: it undermines it.  
Sensible regulation of pension de-risking can substantially reduce its 
dangers. A modest step that we propose is to incentivize employers to 
undertake internal de-risking strategies. Internal de-risking is preferable 
because it preserves ERISA’s protections and PBGC termination 
insurance (which protects pension plan participants in case the plan fails).  
 
 
 152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10–3 (titled “Suitability of recommendations”) (rescinded 1983). 
 153. See Bieganek v. Wilson, 642 F. Supp. 768, 772 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that the SEC 
suitability standard “provided a basis for relief against certain broker dealers who made trades not 
reasonably suited to the customer’s financial objectives”). This DOL suitability standard would add 
protection to IRS Notice 2015-49, under which “employers will have to limit lump sum offers to 
participants who are not yet receiving annuity payments.” See Newman, supra note 33.  
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Encouraging internal de-risking, however, will likely be insufficient. 
External de-risking will still occur, and additional regulatory steps will 
need to meet that challenge—of which we suggest three here. First, 
annuitizations should be regulated so as to increase the likelihood that the 
private annuity that replaces the beneficiary’s pension is equally likely to 
be paid. Second, lump-sum elections should be accompanied by 
meaningful disclosures that effectively inform the beneficiary of the 
consequences of choosing cash today over a lifetime of income. Third, 
regulators should be aggressive in construing the language of ERISA to 
limit lump-sum buyouts where there is reason to believe the beneficiary 
does not understand the consequences of trading a pension for cash. These 
steps will significantly reduce the chance that external pension de-risking 
will imperil the retirement security of millions of elderly workers and 
retirees. 
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